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·INTRODUCTION

The Founding Fathers in a few, simple sentences placed the supreme
military command in the hands of the President and gave to Congress the power
to declare war and to raise armies.

To Alexander Hamilton this division of

power seemed proper and uncomplicated.
11

In The Federalist, #74, he wrote:

0f all the cares and concerns of government, the direction of war most
llt

peculiarly demands those qualities which distinguish the exercise of power by
a single hand." 1 The 11 propriety 11 that he was defending was that of the
Commander in Chief clause of the Constitution of the United States of America
which reads as follows:

11

The President shall be Commander in Chief of the·

Army and Navy of the United States and of the Militia of the several states
when called into the actual service of the United Sta.tes. 11 2 Hamilton went
on to say that this provision was "so consonant to the ·precedents of the
State constitutions in general, that little need be said to explain or enforce
it." 3

The belief of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention that
they had fashioned the key for popular control over military power is
1Alexander Hamilton, James ~dison, John Jay, The Federalist Papers
(New York:· The New American Library, 1961), p. 447.
2u.s., Constitution, Art. 2, Sec. 2, Cl. 1.
3Hamilton, Madison, Jay, p; 447.
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reflected in The Federalist, #69, where Hamilton contended that this power
"would amount to nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the
military and naval forces, as first general and admiral of the Confederacy," 4
· while the power of declaring war, raising and regulating the fleets and armies
would belong to Congress. 5
In the intervening years since 1787 the exercise of military power
. has been endlessly cha 11 enjed, and the federal courts have been re.i>eatedly
asked to define and to limit the Chief Executive in his role as Comnander in
Chief. While American constitutional law contains dozens of examples of
judicial restraint and limitation on the Commander in Chief, comnentators
have suggested that the courts have been ineffectual in holding the President
within judicially defined guidelines in the exercise of military power.
Clinton Rossiter in The Supreme Court and the Commander in Chief states
that:
... the Court has been asked to examine only a tiny
fraction of his significant .deeds and decisions as
.Commander in Chief, for most of these were by nature
challengeable in no court but that of impeachment-which was entirely as it should have been. The
~gurs of the presidential w~r powers have theref<fte been presidentially, not Judicially shaped;

4Ibid., p. 418.
sibid., p. 418.

,. 3 -

their exercise is for Congress and the people, not
the Court, to oversee. 6
This paper will inquire into the validity of Rossiter's position.
In the evolving of American history have the war powers of the President
been defined and checked by the judiciary, or have /they been shaped by the
Chief Executive through various crises?
. 6c11nton Rossiter, Tfie Suprerne·court and the Conmand~r·i·~ Chief (New
York: Cornell University Press, l95l), p. 126.
I

•
THE EXECUTIVE AND THE MILITARY

,.

L
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MILITARY COMMANDER

The President in his role as Commander in Chief of the Army and
Navy may take personal command of the troops as can be seen from the
following episode.

In 1794 four counties in Western Pennsylvania rebelled

against the imposition of a tax on whiskey.

.

In two presidential proclama-

tions Washington tried every measure short
- of actual combat to persuade the
ins·urgents to obey the laws of the land. 7 When all else failed, Washington
'

'

called into service 15,000 militia men from New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia and personally led the militia from September 25th to
October 20th. 8 Comnenting on Washington leaving· the seat of government to·
act as field commander of the militia force, Professor Clarence Berdahl
states:
President Washington was not only clear as to his right
to take personal command of the militia forces upon
s~ch occasions but in the case of the Whiskey Rebellion
of 1794, was also convinced of the necessity of exercising that right. He assumed active command of the
militia forces assembled to crush the insurrection,
visited the place of rendezvous, and personally directed

7James D. Richardson, A Com nlation of the Messa es and Pa ers of
the Presidents, Vol. I, 1789-1908 Washington: Bureau of Literature and
Art, 1897), pp. 158-162.
8Jbid., pp. 164-165 .

.....,__________......,________,___,_wwww...---;,,....--------------------------------------
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the forward movement of the troops, living and marching
with them .... 9
When criticism arose over his leaving the seat of government while Congress
was in session, Wash-ington denounced the criticism as 11 impertinence. 11 10
As military commander the President possesses all of those powers
accorded by

internatio~al

law to any supreme commander.

In The Constitution

of the United States Edward Corwin has cited in the following Supreme Court
cases a most comprehensi~ list of those· powers: 11
1350 - Commander in Chief - "He (the President) is authorized to
direct the movements of the naval and military forces placed by law at his
command, and to employ them in the manner he may deem most effectual to
harass and conquer and subdue the enemy.

He may invade the hostile country,
and subject it to the sovereignty an_d authority of the United States. 11 12
1852 - Power to Requisition Property - Against the enemy in the

field, the President possesses the power to requisition property and
compel services from citizens of the United States and friendly aliens when

9c1arence A. Berdahl, War Powers of the Executive in the United States

(Urbana:

University of Illinois Press, 1921), p. 135.

lOibid.' p. 135.
11 Edward S. Corwin, The Con;titution of the United States of America:
Analysis and Interpretation (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1953),
pp. 403-404.
12Fleming v. Page~ 9 Howard 603 (1850}.
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necessity requires. 13
1874 - Commercial Intercourse - The President may, at least in
the absence of Congressional action to the contrary, permit a limited
commercial intercourse with the enemy in time of war, and impose such conditions as he sees fit: 14
1876 - Secret Agents - "We (the Court)
the authority of the President in the matter.

•

ha~e

no difficulty as to

He (the President) was un-

doubtedly authorized during the war, as Commander-in Chief of the armies
of the United States, to employ secret agents ·to enter the rebel lines and
obtain information respecting the strength, resources, and movements of
the enemy. 15
11

1888 - Dismissal and Appointment of Officers - Having once dismissed an officer or accepted his resignation, the President cannot revoke
that action and thereby restore the officer to his rank and office, but
must make a new nomination and secure a new confirmation by the Senate, if
confirmation was required in the first instance. 16

13Mitchell v. Harmony, 13 Howard 115 (1852).
14Hamilton v. Dillin, 21 Wallace 73 (1874).
15rotten v. United States, ~2 U.S. 105 (1876).
16Mimnack v. United States, 97 U.S. 426, 435, 437-438 (1888).

- 71891 - Dismissal and Appointment of Officers - The provision in
the U.S. Code, Title 10, Section 1590 that the President's power to dismiss
an offi.cer in

peaceti1~e

"in pursuance of .the sentence of .a general court

martial or in mitigation thereof" does not prevent the President from displacing an officer of the Army or Navy by appointing with the advice and
consent of the Senate another person in his place. 17
1897 - Convening of Courts-Martial - Despite the fact that the

•

President is expressly authorized by statute to convene courts-martial under
certain circumstances (Act of May 29, 1830.

4 Statute at Large, 4.17), he

is by no means limited to that specific case, nor dependent upon statuatory.
authority but is empowered to convene such courts-martial generally and
in any case by virtue of his constitutional authority as Commander in
Chief. 18
1901 - Territorial Occupation - While the President's power with
regard to the government of occupied territory is justly said to be
11

necessarily despotic, 11 it has been held that this applied only to his

executive or administrative power and not to his power to legislate for
·that territory.

"His power to administer would be absolute, but his power

to legislate would not be without certain

restrictions-~in

17Mullan v. United States, 140. U.S. 240 (1891).
18swaim v. United States, 165 U.S. 553 (1897).

other words,
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they would not extend beyond the necessities of the case. 11 19
1909 - Territorial Occupation - The civil government of the United
States cannot extend immediately and of its own force over conquered and
ceded territory .... The authority to govern such ... territory is found in
the laws applicable to conquest and cession.

That authority is the military
power, under the control of the President as Commander in Chief. 20
1942 - Creation of Military Commissions - The Court unanimously

•

decided that this specific military commission had been lawfully constituted
and that the saboteurs were clearly subject to its jurisdiction.

It was not

necessary for the Court to discuss the President's power as Commander in
Chief to create this conmission, for Congress in the 15th Article of War had
in effect 11 authorized trial of offenses against the law of war before such
commtssi ons. 11 The offenses charged against the saboteurs were of fens.es
against the law of war, which has always recognized th.at unlawful combatants
are subject 11 to trial and punishment by military tribunals for acts which
render their belligerency unlawful. 11 21
1952 - Military Justice - An <fir force officer on duty in Germany
was killed by his wife in October 1949.

She was tried in the U.S. Court of

l9oooley v. United States, 1~82 U.S. 222, 234 (1901).
20santiago v. Nogueras, 214 U.S. 260, 265 (1909).
21Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. l (1942).
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the Allied High Commission for Germany and was convicted of murder under ·the
German Criminal Code and sentenced to a term of imprisonment in the federal
peni tent:Bry in the United States.

Justice Burton ruled that the military

court was properly set up under the power of the President as Commander in
Chief. 22
Despite the fact that the President as Corumander in Chief must be
guided in the exercise of his power as military commander by his own judg-

•

ment and discretion, subject to his general responsibility under the
Constitution, it is found from the above Supreme Court cases, that the
Court speaks only of the President as Commander in Chief in the most general
and guarded terms.

Justic.e Swayne has best expressed the Court's thinking

on this in Stewart v. Kahn:

"The measures to be taken in carrying on war

and to suppress insurrection are not defined.

The decision of all questions

rests wholly in the discretion of those to whom the substantial powers
involved are confided by the Constitution." 23
One could, therefore, conclude that it is apparently up to the
President to be specific about his powers as Commander in Chief, not the
Court.

22Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 348 (1952).
23stewart v. Kahn, 11 Wallace 493, 506 (1870).

... 10 -

TROOP CALL-UP

One must admit that at specific t.imes, particularly during war
and mobilization, the government imposes certain obligations, but no one
obligation is more oppressive than that one compelling personal service in
the military.

While it is true that the duty to render personal military

service in the United States has been accepted as necessary, it has not
always been desirab!e.

•

Roger Little points out thDt prior to the Revolu-

tionary War, the American colonies had conscripted men into their militias.
For example, Massachusetts and Virginia resorted to conscription in 1777
and since only two-thirds of the authorized Continental army had been
recruited by February, 1778, Washington recommended to the Continental
Congress that the necessary men be recruited from all the colonies by
universal conscription. 24
When the Constitutional Convention assembled in Philadelphia in
1787, Hamilton argued that the ·defense and military powers of the centra 1
government ought exist without limitation
because it is impossible to foresee or to define the
extent and variety of national exigencies, and the
correspondent extent and variety of the means which
may be necessary to satisfy them. The circumstances

York:

24Roger W. Little (ed.), Selective Service and American Society (New
Russell Sage Foundation, 1969), p. 36.
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that endanger the safety of nations are infinite, and
for this reason no constitutional shackles can wisely
be imposed on the power to which the care of it is
committed .... 25
The Constitution states that Congress is delegated with the power "to raise
and support armies, to provide and maintain a Navy," and "to provide for
calling forth the militia." These powers were reinforced by the provision
authorizing Congress "to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper
for carrying into executi3n the foregoing powers. 11 26
Given the above, it would appear that the President as Conmander
in Chief has no powers with regard to troop call-up.
Glendon Schubert succinctly points out:

This is not so, as

"The President has always been

delegated considerable discretion in implementing the plans of Congress,
especially with respect to the circumstances in which the reserves might
be called up for temporary duty in time of national emergency proclaimed
by the President himself.
is today." 27

This was true in George Washington's time, as it.

Various Congressional .Acts passed in the late 18th, 19th, and
early 20th centuries gave the President virtually unlimited power in

25Hamilton, Madison, Jay, p., 153.
26u.s., Constitution, Art. 1, Sec. 8, Cl. 12-16.
27Glendon A. Schubert, Jr., The Presidency in the Courts (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1957), p. 173.
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calling up the militia and in raising armies in case of invasion, threat·
of invasion or insurrection. 28 Clinton Ro~siter in The Supreme Court and
the Commander in Chief discusses two leading Supreme Court cases that
challenge the President's authority and orders with regard to military
conscription. 29
In the first case, Martin v. Mott, the

go~ernor

of the State of

New York, in compliance with a request from the President of the United

•

States, ordered certain companies of militia to assemble in the City of
New York for the purpose of entering the service of the United States.
The President acted in accordance with a federal statute empowering him
to call the militia whenever there shall be danger of invasion.
privat~

Mott, a

in one of the cornp_anies called, refused to comply with the order

of the governor.

In 1818 a court ma~tial imposed on ~im a fine of $96.00,

and when he refused to pay he was sentenced to twelve months imprisonment.
Martin, Deputy United States Marshall, seized certain. goods of Mott, which
Mott sought to recover by action of replevin.

Mr. Justice Story in his

opinion of a unanimous decision in 1827 stated that:

"We are all of the

opinion that the authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen belongs
exclusively to the President, and that his decision is conclusive upon all

28serdahl, pp. 102-114.
29Rossiter, pp. 14-17.
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other persons."

In essence, then, the President under law can call for the
militia of states when no invasion has taken place. 30
In the second .case, Luther v. Borden, the people of the State of
Rhode Island in 1871 were still operating under the old colonial charter
with a few minor revisions, using it as their state constitution.
stitution strictly limited the right to vote.

This con-

Led by a man named Dorr, the

people at various mass meetings throughout the state instituted a new con-

•

stitution whereby suffrage was greatly increased.

The state government

claimed that this was an insurrection and appealed to the President to declare martial law.

However, no federal forces were used.

Members of the

state mHitia led by Borden forced their way into the house of Luther, a
Dorr adherent, who sued for trespass.

Mr. Chief Justice Taney in -his

opinion in 1849 dec;lared that the President in exercfsing the power conferred
on him by Congress to send federal troops to aid states in suppressing
insurrection had indicated that he regarded the charter government as the
lawful government, and this decision was binding upon the Court.

In other

words, this was a purely political case and must be le.ft in the hands of the
political branches of the government to decide.

Moreover, once a political

branch of the government reaches a decision, "the courts are bound to take
notice of its decision, and to f0ellow it. 11 31

30Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheaton 19 (1827).
31Luther v. Borden, 7 Howard 1 (1849}.
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Schubert cites four state c.ases in The Presidency and the Courts
that upheld the President's authority to raise an army. 32
1863 - The Court of Conmon Pleas of Dauphin County, Pennsylvania,
decided that the President's orders, (General Order #99 set up the method
of selecting, drawing, and enforcing the attendance of the militia in the
respective states; General Order #104 provided for the arrest of persons
absenting themselves to avoid being drafted into military service), "must be

•

considered as having all the force of a law, the same as if specially set
forth at length in the act." 33
1863 - The Supreme Court of Wisconsin upheld President Lincoln's
General Orders, Number 99 and 104. The argument that the President had
been _unconstitutionally delegated legislative power was expressly rejected
on the basis that in merely filling in the details of the statute he was
undertaking a necessary part of his function of executing its provisions. 34
1867 - The Supreme Court of Wisconsin ruled that the governor of
Wisconsin, acting as an agent of the President had properly used his discretionary powers in putting down an insurrection and enforcing the laws,
and that his (the governor's) actions were to be regarded as those acts of

32schubert, pp. 176-177.
33commonwealth ex rel Wendt v. Andreas, 2 Pitts. Rep. (Pa.) 402, 404
( 1863).
34 1n re Griner, 16 Wis. 423 (1863).
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the President.

35

1867 - The Supreme Court of New Hampshire upheld the fact that the
President had the power to cause the arrest of draft dodgers for the purpose
of forcibly inducting them into military service. 36
In 1918 Chief Justice Edward White ruled that the Selective Draft
Law Cases were "an act to authorize the President to increase temporarily
the military establishmenteof the United States" and therefore upheld the
conscription act which became and still remains the basic statement of the
Court on the powers of the Federal government to conscript military manpower. 37
Also in a ruling on Arver v. United States, the Supreme Court
ruled that the Selective Draft Law of 1917 was a valid exercise of the war
power and dispelled once and for all ttme the notion that there is something
inherently unconstitutional or extraconstitutional about drafting men to
fight wars. 38 In Arver v. United States the Court did not decide the constitutional question (Article I, Section 8) of whether or not the President
as Commander in Chief has the power to raise armies even with congressional
•

35Drucker v. Salomon, 21 Wis. 621, 631 (1867).

'
36Allen v. Colby, 47 N.H. 544, 547-548 (1867).
37 selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 375 (1918).
38Arver v. United States, 245 U.S. 366 (1918).
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approval.

To ·date the Supreme Court has yet to face that question. 39
This can be seen again in United States v. Nugent where Chief

Justice Fred M. Vinson ruled that the Selective Service Act is a comprehensive statute designed to provide an orderly, efficient, and fair procedure
to marshall the available manpower of the country, to impose a common obligation of

milit~ry

service on all physically fit young men .. It is. a valid

exercise of the war power. It is calculated to function--it functions today-in times of peril. ~O
Therefore, the legislative history and administrative application
on the question of compelling men to serve in the armed services of their
country remains today, a political decision.
this policy when it stated that:

11

The Supreme Court supported

The power to compel men to serve in the

armed forces is reasonably implied from the power to raise and support
armies, for a grant of power with no compulsion behind it is no power at
all. 11 41
39 schubert, p. 117.
40united States v. Nugent, 346 U.S. l, 9 (1953).
41Arver v. United States, 245 U.S. 366 (1918). See Carl Brent Swisher,
11
The Supreme Court and Conscription, 11 Current History, Vol. 54, pp. 351-357
for an excellent summation of mil,tary conscription from the Revolution to
the present day.

17

MILITARY JUSTICE

Military justfce comes under the heading of two tribunals, i.e.,
courts-martial for those offenders of military law, and military commissions
for the trial of those offenders of the laws of. war as well as martial law.
{See Section 2 for a discussion of military commissions.) Authority for
courts-martial stems from•congressional statutes whereas the authority for
military commissions stems from the common law of war. 42 Despite the fact
that authorization for courts-martial lies in the hands of Congress, its
control rests primarily in the hands of the President as Commander in Chief.
"They are creatures of orders, the power to convene them, as well as the
power to act upon their proceeding, being an attribute of command." 43
Under the Act of May 29, 1830, the President is expressly authorized by statute to convene general courts-martial under certain circumstances. 44 However, this does not mean that the President as the fountainhead of military justice is expressly limited to that specific case, nor
is he dependent upon statuatory authority.

As Rossiter points out in

42serdahl, p. 138.
43william W. Winthrop, Di est of 0 in1ons: Jud e Advocate General
{Washington: Superintendent of Documents, 1901 , p. 283.
44u.s., Statutes at Large, IV, 417.
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The Supreme Court and the Commander in Chief citing Swaim v. United States-that he (the President) is empowered to convene such courts-martial, generally
and in any case, by virtue of his constitutional authority as Commander in
Chief. 45 David G. Swaim, Judge Advocate General with the rank of Brigader
General, was accused of fraud and.improper dealings with a Washington bank.
He was found guilty, sentenced, and brought suit on .the grounds _that the
general courts-martial

ha~been

unlawfully tried and sentenced.

unlawfully constituted and that he had been
Justice Shiras declared that the courts-

martial in question was duly convened and organizeciand that the questions
decided were within its lawful scope of action, and further that it would be
out of place for the court to express any opinion. 46
A further discussion of non-intervention in cases of courts-martial
is found in the following cases:
1827 - The Court granted conclusive discretion to the President
and his officers in such matters as fixing the number of officers between
the statuatory limits of five and thirteen for any particular courtsmartial. 47
In 1894 the Court went so far as to say that a person convicted of
45Rossiter, p. 102.
'
.46swaim v. United St.ates, 165 U.S. 553, 558 (1897).
47Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheaton 19, 34-35 (1827).
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a courts-martial must exhaust all administrative remedies ... before a fede'ral
court would be justified in granting a hearing to entertain collateral
attack on the courts-martial 's judgment. 48
The Civil Court ruled in 1857 in Dynes v. Hoover that civil
courts do not handle courts-martial--if they did, they would virtually
administer the rules and articles of war, irrespective of those .to whom that
duty and obligation has b'iien confided by the laws of the United States from
whose decisions no appeal or jurisdiction of any kind has been given to the
civil magistrates or civil courts. 49
1902 - The Court stated that a member of the armed forces belongs
to a separate conmunity recognized by the Constitution and.therefore must be
tried by a courts-martial .. 50
In 1911 the Court ruled that "to those in military or naval service
of the United States, the military law is the due process." 51
While it is the President's own judgment as to the convening of
courts-martial, he may delegate this action to a subordinate such as the
Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy as can be seen from the

48In re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147 (1894).

'

49oynes v. Hoover, 20 Howard 65 (1857).
50carter v. Mela ugh ry, 183 U.S. 365 (1902) .
51Reaves v. Ainsworth, 219 U.S. 296 (1911).
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rulings in the following cases.
In Runkle v. United States the Court declared that it was up to
the President's judgment· as to the convening of courts-martial, and the
finding in United States v. Fletcher stated that he (the President) could
delegate this power to one of his subordinates; namely the Secretary of War
or the Secretary of the Navy. 52
The Court furthw- ruled in Bishop v. ~United States that the actions
of the presidential delegates in convening courts-martial were presumed to be
those acts of the President. 53
Given a look at the above cases, it can be said that, in general,
the Courts will not interfere in the jurisdiction of military justice. 54
The Courts will, however, review cases to ascertain if the courts-martial
was legally constituted; to ascertain whether the military had jurisdiction
of the case; and to ascertain whether or not the sentence was duly approved
52Runkle v. United States, 122 U.S. 543, 557 (1887) and United States v.
Fletcher, 148 U.S. 84, 88-89 (1893).
53Bishop v. United States, 197 U.S~ 334, 341-342 (1905).
54 cases under the Uniform Code of Military Justice in the 1940's and
1950's will not be reviewed here as they deal primarily with the relationship
of courts-martial to civilian courts--not with the powers of the President as
Commander in Chief. The cases ar~ Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 (1949);
Humphrey v. Smith, 336 U.S. 695 (1949); United States ex rel Hirshberg v.
Cooke, 336 U.S. 210 (1949); United States ex rel Toth v. uarles, 350 U.S.
11 (1955); and Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524 1957 . See C. Herman
Pritchett, The American Constitution (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company,
Inc., 1959), pp. 354-357 for a discussion of these cases.

r[---------------------------------------~
~·.

1
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and authorized by law. 55
Edward F. Shennan, in his article on "Military Injustice,"

SllllS

'
the Court's position on military law cases in the following
statement:

Supreme Court decisions do not directly affect the
military because military law has been held to be an
autonomous legal system not subject to the same constitutional standards as civil courts. However, the
Court of Military Appeals, a civilian court created
in 1951 by the Uniform Code of Military Justice as a
sort of 'Military Supreme Court' has applied a number
of Supreme Cour-adecisions to the military, the
latest test being the application of Mir~nda to the
military in United States v. Tempir in 1967. 56

55swaim v. United States, 28 Ct. Cl. 173, 217 (1893).
56Edward F. Sherman, i'Military Injustice," New Republic, Vol. 158
(March, 1968), pp. 20-23.

up
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MILITARY GOVERNMENT

.

Before attempting to discuss the President's role as Corrmander in
Chief in military government, it must first be ascertained what military
government is.

Mr. Winthrop defines it as "that dominion exercised in war by

a belligerent power over territory invaded and occupied by him and over the
inhabitants thereof." 57 Chief Justice Chase defined military government in
lit

Ex parte Milligan.as "military justice to be exercised in time of foreign
war without the boundaries of the United States, or in time of rebellion and
civil war within states and districts occupied by rebels treated as
belligerents; .•. by the military commander under the direction of the President, with the express or implied sanction of Congress." 58
Belligerent or military occupation· has been going on from ancient
times up to and including the 20th Century in some way, shape, or form.·
Caesar's memoirs provide a running commentary on his
relations with the Helvetians, the Belgae, and the
Nervii, while the protests back in Rome that Caesar was
usurping the Senate's authority by making political
decisions are not without their modern counterparts.
Alexander, Belisarius, Hannibal, Napoleon, George Rogers
Clark, Winfield Scott, Cecil Rhodes, Sherman, and

57 william W. Winthrop, An Abridgment of Military Law (New York:
Wi 1ey and Sons , 1893) , p. 322.
58Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wallace 2, 141-143 (1866). ·
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Pershing--all knew military government at first hand ...... 59
One out of every six years of our national existence has been spent in war,

.

and there have been at least seventeen instances in which the United States
has participated in military occupation of one kind or another. 60
In 1862 President Lincoln directed a lawyer, Francis Lieber, to
draw up a code of laws for military occupation, directing the troops in the
laws of war.

Under Articl; I of the Code, it states that "Martial Law is the

immediate and direct effect and consequence of occupation or conquest. The
,presence of a hostile army proclaims its martial law." Article II adds that
11

Martial Law does not cease during the hostile occupation, except by special

proclamation, ordered by the Commander in Chief,"and in Article III can be
found a clause stating that "the commander of the forces may proclaim that the
administration of all civil and penal law shall continue, either wholly or in
part, as in times of peace, unless otherwise ordered by the military authority." 61 Given Lieber'swording of his Code, one can easily assume that he
was concerned more with the unhampered ability of the conquerors to act, than
with limitations restricting the conquerors.

59Hardy C. Dillard, "Power and Persuasion: The Role of Military. Government," The Yale Law Review, Vol. 42 (December, 1952), p~- 212.
60 Ibid., p. 212.
~

61
, War of the Rebellion--Official Records of the Union and
Confede-r-at_e__,.A-rm_,i,.....e-s-, Series III, Vol. III, (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1899), pp. 148-164.

- 24 Prior. to Lieber's Code, Justice Story ruled ·in 1819 that by the
conquest and military occupation of Castine (by the British in the War of
1812) the enemy acquired that firm possession which enabled him to exercise
the fullest right of sovereignty over that place. 62 Along the same line of
thought, President Polk stated in a special message to the House of Representatives on July 24, 1848, that "military occupation permits the occupant,
during the war, to exercise the fullest rights of sovereignty" over the

•

occupied territory. The sovereignty of the enemy is thereby suspended and
· his laws can "no longer be rightfully enforced over the conquered territory
or be obligatory upon the inhabitants who remain and submit to the conqueror." 63
Given the above, then, when American military operations bring
. foreign territories under its contra l, it is up to the President as
Commander in Chief to "take whatever measures he thinks necessary to insure
the we 11-bei ng of the American occupying forces and those of the people of
the occupied area. This may involve the taking over of the entire government
of the area under military control." 64 However, the military control of the

62 united States v. Rice, 4 Wheaton 246 (1819).
63Richardson, Vol. IV, p. 595.
64 Joseph E. Kallenbach, The American Chief Executive (New York:
and Row, 1966), p. 540.
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occupied territory does not give the President as Commander in Chief the
authority to annex the occupied territory to the United States.

This was

evidenced in Chief justice Taney's opinion in Fleming v. Page.

In holding

'i

r

that military occupation of the port of Tampico during the Mexican War did
not annex it to the United States, Taney said:
and his power are purely military.

11

His (the President's) duty

As Commander in

Chief~

he is authorized

to direct the movements of the naval and military forces placed by law at

•

his command, and to employ them in a manner he may deem most effectual to
harass and conquer and subdue the enemy .... But his conquests .do not enlarge
the boundaries of this union. 11 65
In his article on "American Experiences with Military Government"
Ralph Gaoriel states that:
The exercise of military government is a command responsibility and full legislative, executive and judicial
authority is vested in the command general of the theatre
of operations. By virtue of his posit ion he is the mil i tary governor of the occupied territory and his supreme
authority is limited only by the laws and customs of
war. Military government is primarily an instrument for
carrying out the policy of the . President in his role g5
Commander in Chief, established in the Constitution.
A classic example of command responsibility is that of General
William S. Graves who refused to recognize General Otani of the Japanese

65Fleming v. Page, 9 Howard 603 (1850).
66Ralph H. Gabriel, "American Experiences with Military Government,"
American Political Science Review, Vol. 37 (June, 1943), p. 438.
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Imperial Army as head of the Allied Council and his disposition of American
troops in the attempt by the United States to keep Japan out of Siberia.
Graves demanded to know who put the American soldiers in their presently
located areas; Otani responded that the Inter-Allied Council under his comI

mand had situated them.

Graves then stated:

straightened out right now.
~

~

•,

I'm at once

ordering my troops to railroad zones •••• " The War Department and the
President gave full approval to his conduct as military commander. 67

~·

~

I don't recognize you or anyone else as

. being Commander in Chief of any so-called Allied E'pedition.

~c
i

"Well, let's get this matter

I am in command of the American Expeditionary

Force, and .in sole commanct-of it.

~.

~/'

.

Professor Berdahl cites other cases in War Powers of the Executive
·in the United States whereby the Supreme Court has conceded that the President's power and authority as Commander in Chief gives him absolute discretion in the realm of occupied territory, 68 subject only to the vaguely ·
defined international laws of war. 69
Early in 1847 the President as constitutional Commander in Chief
of the Anny and Navy, authorized the mi 1i tary and nava 1 cornnander of our
forces in California to exercise the belligerent rights of a conqueror, and
I

:

•

•

I'

!

'

,Jo.-

to fonn a civil government ~or~ t~e conque red c1ou~~ry, ~,nd. t~_!!!!Pos-eduti es on
1

'
67 Ibid., p. 438.
68eerdahl, pp. 191-199..

"',

1
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imports and tonnage as military contributions for the support of the government, and of the anny which had the conquest in possession.

The Court ruled

that no one can doubt that these orders of the President, and the action of
our army and navy commander in California, in conformity with them, was
according to the law of anns and the right to conquest, or that they were
operative until the ratification and exchange of a Treaty of Peace. 70
Upon the conques.t of New Mexico the executive authority of the
United States properly established a provisional government which instituted
a judicial system, the legality of which was recognized by the Supreme
Court. 71
In Texas v. White the Supreme Court held that so long as the war
contfoued it cannot be denied that he (the President) might institute
temporary governments within insurgent districts·, occupied by the national
forces, or take measures, in any state, for the restoration of State governments faithful to the Union, employing, however, in such efforts only such
means and such agents as were authorized by constitutional laws. 72
When during the late Civil War, portions of the insurgent territory

70cross v. Harrison, 16 Howard 164, 190 (1853).
71Leitensdorfer v. Webb, 20 ffoward 176, 177-178 (1857).
72Texas v. White, 7 Wallace 700, 730 (1868).

- 28 were occupied by the national forces, it was within the constitutional
authority of the President as Commander in Chief to establish therein provisional courts for the hearing and determination of all causes arising
under the laws of the State or of the United States; and the provisional
court for the State of Louisiana organized under the Proclamation of October
20, 1862 was, therefore, rightfully authorized to exercise such jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court held that-"the duty of the national government •.. was no
I

1

other than that which devolves upon the government of
ing, during war, the territory of another belligerent.

a belligerent

occupy-

It was a military

duty to be performed by the President as Conmander in Chief and entrusted as
such with the direction of the military force by which the occupation was
held. 73
In Dow v. Johnson the Supreme Court ruled that "It is not the civil
law of the invaded country; it is not the civil law of the conquering
country; it is the military law--the law of war 11 --that governs a milit,rily
occupied territory. 74
It was declared in 1901 that Cuba is a foreign territory within
the meaning of the Act of Congress of June 6, 1900, amending the United
States Revised Statute, Section 5270 ••• the island is under a -~!JJ..tat<y govern'f.

.

ment appointed by the President of the United States in the work of assisting
73rhe Grapeshot, 9 Wallace 129 (1869).
740ow v. Johnson, 100 U.S. 158, 170 (1879).

29

the inhabitants of the island to establish a government of their own.

The

court ruled that the occupancy and control of the island of Cuba under
military authority of the United States cannot be deemed to be an unconstitutional and unauthorized interference with the internal affairs of a
friendly power, by virtue of the joint resolution of Congress of April 20,
1898 declaring that 11 the people of Cuba are, of right ought to be, free and
independent," since this declaration was not intended as a recognition of

•

the existence of an organized government instituted by the people of that
island in hostility to the government maintained by Spain. 75
The Supreme Court ruled in Dooley v. United States that the
President's power, is necessarily despotic in military occupation, but that
this must. be understood rather in an administrative than in a legislative
sense. 76
In Herrera v. United States the Court ruled that

nei~her

the

capitulation of Santiago and the cessation of active military operations in
the Santiago ,, district, nor the Presidential proclamation of July 13, 1898,
(General Order 101 - "private property, whether belonging to individuals or
corporations is to be respected and can be confiscated only for cause"),
with reference to the rights of private property, changed the character of a
~'

75Neeley v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 124 (1901).
76ooo1ey v. United States, 183 U.S. 151 (1901).
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Spanish merchant vessel lying in the harbor as enemy's property, nor exempted
it from liability to capture by the military authorities for military purposes
1•

~

r

The Court upheld the capture of the vessel in that it was seized as property
for pu.rposes of war and not of gain. 77

[
'f
f

L

The Supreme Court upheld all of the above decisions, as well as
the President's power as Commander in Chief to organize and practically
control the judiciary

oft~

territory under military occupation, with the

following exception:
In Jecker v. Montgomery decided in 1851, the Court held that
neither the President nor anymilitary officer can establish a court in a
conquered country and authorize it to decide upon the rights of the United
States· or of individuals in prize cases, nor to administer the laws of the
nation.

The courts established and sanctioned in· Mexico were nothing more

than agents of military power to assist it in preserving order in the
conquered territory and to protect the inhabitants in their persons and
property while it was occupied by the American army.

They were not courts of

the United States and they had no right to adjudicate upon a question· of a
prize or no prize. 78
The issue of military occupation is not a dated subject.

It is as

current as present American involvement in Korea, the Dominican Republic and

77Herrera v. United States, 222 U.S. 558, 571 (1912).
78Jecker v. Montgomery, 13 Howard 498, 515 (1851).
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Vie~nam.

Though the fonns, definitions, or styles may change, the problem of

occupation will always be present as long as the United States has a military
or national security problem.
by saying:

Professor Berdahl aptly sums up the situation

"Since all the powers and functions of military government are

concentrated in the hands of the President, with scarcely any limitation, it
would not be an exaggeration to characterize such government as an absolutism
of the most complete sort. 11 79

•

79Berdahl,. p. 164.

,. .
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THE EXECUTIVE AND THE ENEMY
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ALIEN ACTS OF 1798

·The first attempt at alien and enemy control through legislation
came with Congress' passage of a series of acts called the Naturalization,
Alien, and Sedition Acts which were primarily aimed at domestic dissatisfaction as well as at foreign danger.

This section of the paper will concern

itself only with the Alien Act .

•

War with France was expected daily during the Sumner of 1798 by
which time "the French had captured over three hundred American merchant
vessels, and an undeclared war with France was raging on the sea. 80 The
11

Federalist majority hastily passed the Alien Act among others. 81 This Act
not only .authorized the President to remove all aliens whom he considered
. dangerous to the

pe~ce

and safety of the country, but ·it also provided the

President with the power to deport those aliens who were merely suspected of
treasonable or secret schemes against the government. 82
If '> an alien was deported from the country, and should return and
be found at large, he was to be tried and if

convicted~

sentenced to

80Frank Donovan, The Thomas Jefferson Papers (New York:
Company, 1963), p. 163.
,
1

Dodd, Mead and

..

8 U.S., Statutes at Large, I, 570.
82James M. Smith, Freedom's Fetters (New York:
Press, 1956), p. 51.
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imprisonment for a term not to exceed three years, as well as forfeiting· all
rights to ever becoming a citizen of the United States. 83
The Act not only set forth the ground rules for expulsion, but
also provided for a national registration and surveillance system in which
those aliens remaining in the country would have to have a special pennit
issued by a presidential agent.
whereby the President

mig~t

There were exceptio.ns to the rule, however,

exempt foreign ministers, consuls, alien mer-

chants, etc., from obtaining the special permits as well as an executive
grant of safe conduct or passport privileges as long as the aliens conformed
to presidential regulations. 84
(

'r

I
l
~

r;,
[

"The worst feature of this Act was the extent of .the power that it
left to the President.

Th~

poor aliens, as the Republicans called· them,

were pl aced at his mercy; ... it was necessary to create some authority for the
enforcement of the law, and Congress considered that the President, through

'

t,..

his marshalls, could best execute it." 85
"

President John Adams, in a letter to Thomas Jefferson in 1813,
asserted that he had never applied the Alien Act in a single instance.

· 83 Ibid., p. 52.
84Ibid., p. 53, 54.

t
l

85John S. Bassett, The American Nation: A History, Vol. II, The
Federalist System, 1789-1801 (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1906)..t .12.," 258.
LOYOLA UNlVERSITY LIBRAK.1..
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As your name is subscribed to that law, as vice-president, and mine as President, I know not why you are
not as responsible for it as I am. Neither of us was
concerned in the formulation of it. We were then at
war with France. French spies then swarmed in our
cities and our country; some of them were intolerably
impudent, turbulent, and seditious. To check these,
was the design of this law. Was there ever a government which had not authority to defend itself against
spies in its own bosom--spies of an enemy at war?
This law was never executed by me in any instance. 86
However, there were.as Frait'lk M. Anderson points out in his article on "The
Enforcement of the Alien and Sedition Laws;"
indications if not proofs that a considerable number
of aliens anticipating the enforcement of the law, left
the country on account of it. A 1arge number of French
refugees from the West Indies were in the United States
when the Alien Act was passed. Letombe, the French
consul general, estimated the number at 20,000 to 25,000.
Other estimates were even higher. The Archives of the Department of State at Washington contain abundant evidence that
directly after the passage of the Alien Act, large numbers
of these French refugees left the United States. Although
the going of most of these can be fully accounted for on
other grounds, there are indications that with some of
them, apprehension on account of the Alien Act was a
factor in bringing about thei~ departure. 87
The ultimate justification of the Alien Act which was to

continu~

in force until December, 1799, was that it was necessary to the defense of
the country against foreign aggression.

Its powers conferred to the P.resident
- _,.,,.,.,.-

86 charles F. Adams, The Works of John Adams, Vol. X {Boston:
Brown and Company, 1856), p. 42.

Little,

87Frank M. Anderson, "The Enforcement of the Alien and Sedition Laws,"
Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1912
(Washington, 1914), pp. 11 s-116.

i
~:

r:

;,
~

- 35 -

were upheld as a legitimate exercise of the war power in a House ·conmittee
Report

submi~ted

on February 21,

~7-99~

The Report reads as follows:

The right of removing aliens, as an incident to the
power of war and peace, according to the theory of the
Constitution, belongs to the government of the United
States .•. Congress is required to protect each state
from invasion; and it is vested •.• with powers to make
all laws which shall be proper to carry into effect all
powers vested by the Constitution in the government of
the United States, or in any department or officer thereof; and to retnolll! from the country, in times of hostility,
dangerous aliens, who may be employed in;preparing the
way for invasion, is a measure necessary for the purpose
of preventing invasion, and, of course, a measure that
Congress is empowered to adopt •..• 88
.
Nearly a century passed before the Federal Statute of 1892 requiring all Chinese laborers to obtain certificates of residence was enacted.
The Supreme Court upheld this statute in Fong Yue Ting v. United States by a
6 to 3 vote. Justice Gray ruled that the power of Congress to expel or
1

exclude aliens is an aspect of the plenary control over international relations which is an inherent and

inalie~able

right of every sovereign and

independent nation. Gray was even of the opinion that Congress could have
ordered deportation of aliens lacking certificates of residence by direct
executive action, without any judicial trial or examination at all. 89
The Alien Enemy Act of 1798 is still in force,· and _.-----·
it~,.rUSe.was
upheld in Ludecke v. Watkins.

LuCtecke, a Gennan enemy. alien, who had been

88serdah 1, pp. 187-188.
89Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
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interned in the United States during World War II, was ordered deported to
Germany in January 1946, when the shooting war was over, but before the
legal state of the war had been terminated.

Justice Frankfurter ruled that

the President was acting under his war powers and that the order of deportation was not judicially reviewable. 9o

In Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, Justice Jackson ruled that the
policy toward aliens is vi.tally and intricately interwoven with contemporaneous policies in regard to the conduct of foreign relations, the war power,
and

the maintenance of a republican form of gove,rnment, which are so

exclusively entrusted to the political branches of government as to be
largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference. 91
· Although the Supreme Court has ruled that deportation of aliens is
· a civil rather than a criminal matters and the power rests with the federal
government, the basic constitutional authority of Congress to deport or to
delegate this power to the President has not been questioned.
(

One can

assume, therefore, that this is a political question--one in which the Court

L . wi 11

not become involved.

90Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948).
91Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, '342 U.S. 580 (1952).
t.
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MILITARY TRIAL OF ENEMIES
Since courts-martial are for those offenders of military law, (see
section on Military Justice) another type of tribunal was needed for the
trial of civilians as well as mi1itary personnel who are accused of criminal
· . acts contrary to the common laws of war as well as martial
~· reason military comm1ss i Olli were established. 92
l

law~

For this

I

It is within the,President's authority as Conmander in Chief to
deter.mine the composition of the military commissions. There is no statuatory maximum or minimum with regard to the number of members on the

,.

'

colTITlission. Military colTITlissions, however, have usually been composed of

!

five members.

Less than three members would be contrary to past precedent;
but any number would be legal. 93 The military ' cormnission
convened by order
!
of President Johnson for the trial of Lincoln's assassins was composed of
n.i ne members . 94
Congress by statute has subjected to military· trials any person
who in time of war is found lurking as a spy or acting as a spy; and person
who aids or attempts to aid the enemy with arms, anmunition. supplies, money,
.--/·

92
, Manual for Cburts-Martial (Washington:·' Government
Printing Office, 1910), p. 6.
9Jwinthrop, An Abridgment ••• , p. 333.
94Guy w. Moore, The Case of Mrs. Surratt (Norman: University of
. _Oklahoma
________
_ _ _ _ _1954).
_ _ _ _ _ _p.
___
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. . .
Press,
30.

1

;;.

l
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.

.

.. · or any other thing; any person who, without proper authority, knowingly
harbors or protects or gives intelligence to or corrmunicates or corresponds
'·

with or holds any intercourse with the enemy directly or indirectly; and any
person who by the law of war is subject to trial by a military trial. 95
President Roosevelt established a military corrmission in 1942 to
try eight German saboteurs who had been landed in the United States by
submarine for the

of blowing up factories, military equip-

express~urpose

I

ment and installations. When the case before the fuilitary tribunal was
nearly finished, the counsel for the saboteurs, despite an executive order
denying the saboteurs a11 access to ci vi 1 courts, obtained a writ of habeas
corpus contending
their right to a trial in a civil court.
.~-·

decision of 8 to O, Mr. Chief Justice Stone ruled that it was unnecessary
to determine the extent of presidential authority

~s

Corrmander in Chief

since tongress had provided for the trial of offenses against the law of war
by such commissions, and the acts charged against the saboteurs were offenses
against the law of war.
It has not hitherto been challenged, and, so far as
we are advised, it has never been suggested in the
very extensive literature of the subject that an alien
spy, in time of war, could not be tried by military
_____,,
tribunal without a jury. We conclude that the Fifth
and Sixth Amendments did not restrict whatever authotltY

'

-

95Lewis Mayers, The American Legal System.(New York:· Harper &Brothers,
1955), p. 532.
.
.

'

;"'

l

In a unanimous

j

It

,:

- 39 was conferred by the Constitution to try offenses
against the law of war by military commissions, and
that petitioners, charged with such an offense not
required to be tried by jury at common law, were
la~fully g1aced on trial by the Commission without
a Jury. 9

!·

'
~.

Following World War II certain Japanese generals who had commanded

t

f~ .
~

,,
'

'~

troops in the Pacific theatre of war were. placed on trial before an American
·military commission in the Philippines. Yamashita, Commanding General of

I

I

the Fourteenth Army Group of the Imperial Japanese/Army in the Philippine

f

r~

t

~'.
t:
l
f

Islands, was charged with violating the laws of war in pennitting members of

.

his command to commit brutal atrocities and other high crimes against the
people of the United States and its allies.
The Supreme Court again recognized the right to challenge the

e
I•.
i

r
'r

military proceedings by a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. However, the
I

Court held that the military .commission had been properly set up in accordance with federal statutes which provided for trial by such commissions of
enemy combatants charged with violating' the law of war. The Court ruled that
the authority of the military had not ended with the cessation of hostilities,
. but only with the formal establishment of peace by either proclamation or
treaty. The Court further held that the offenses charged against Ge.neral
Yamashita constituted violations pf the law of war, and declafed.that the
procedure and rules of evidence employed by the military commission are not

l----·9_6E_x_·.iillpa•r-te-Q-u1_r_1n_,_
....
31_7_u._s_._1_,_3_0_(1-9-42

)_._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ .
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subject to judicial scrutiny but are reviewable only by higher military
authorities. 97
Hirota v. MacArthur differed from In re Yamashita in that the
Japanese defendents involved had been tried for war crimes before a military
tribunal set up by General MacArthur as the agent for the Allied Powers which
had defeated Japan.

The defendents attempted to file petitions of habeas

..

corpus directly with the Supreme Court, but their motions were denied on the
grounds that the courts of the United Stat.es could have no jurisdiction over
this tribunal due to its international character.
We are satisfied that the tribunal sentencing these
petitioners is not a tribunal of the United States.
The United States and other Allied countries conquered
and now occupy. and control Japan. General Douglas
MacArthur has be.en selected and is acting as the Supreme
Commander for the Allied Powers. The military tribunal
sentencing these petitioners has been set up by General
MacArthur as the agent of the Allied Powers. Under
the foregoing circumstances the courts of the United
States have no power or authority to review, to affirm,
set aside or annul the judgments and sentences imposed
on these petitioners and for this reason the motions
f~r leave to file petitions for writs of habeas corpus
.
are denied. 98
Johnson v. Eisentrager was convened by twenty-one German nationals
in the service of the German government who were located in China during
World War II.

They were charged with having, in violation of the law of war,
~

97 1n re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
98Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197, 198 (1948).

l---------_____,
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continued hostilities after the surrender of Gennany by furnishing intelligence regarding American forces to the Japanese.

After the surrender of

Japan, the German nationalists were taken into custody and convicted by an
American military commission in the Chinese theatre.

The def en dents app 1i ed

for and obtained from the court of appeals in the District of Columbia, a
writ of habeas corpus on the grounds that 11 any perso.n, including an enemy
alien, deprived of his liberty anywhere under the purported authority of the

•

United States is entitled to the writ if . ·he can show that extension to his
case of any constitutional rights or limitations would show his imprisonment
illegal."

When the case reached the Supreme Court, however, it said that it

had never heard of a writ of habeas corpus being issued by a court on behalf
of an

~lien

enemy who, at ro relevant time and in no stage of his ·captivity,

.

has been within its (the United States) territorial jurisdiction.

Residence

within the country is essential to qualify an alien for judicial protection
by American courts and an enemy alien not within our borders had no right of
access to our courts. 99
As can be seen from the above cases, the Supreme Court shows little
concern of enemy aliens and members of the armed forces of enemy powers with
regard to their subjection to military trial and punishment.

Enemy

alien~

who penetrate United States lines,in an attempt to commit sabotage, as well

99Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 789 (1950).
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;,

as those captured enemies accused of war crimes, may be condemned to death by

.

~.
f

a military commission set up by the President as Commander in Chief.

Insofar

as the Court is satisfied that the military comnission is set up under the
laws of war, it will not inquire into the conformity of their proceedings to
those of due process of law.

The Court also has refused to look into the

procedures employed by military commissions in the trial of enemy aliens
outside the United States.

•

In short, the Supreme Court will not interfere

with the President's authority as Commander in Chief with regard to military
~.

commissions convened for the trial of offenders against the laws of war.
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MARTIAL LAW AND THE JAPANESE-AMERICANS

Alarmed by the supposed danger of Japanese invasion of the Pacific
coast after Pearl Harbor and under the apprehension that all persons of
Japanese ancestry were a potential threat to the United States, President
Franklin D. Roosevelt issued Executive Order No. 9066 in response to increasing pressures from the War Department as well as Congress.

•

The Order

authorized the Secretary of War to prescribe "military areas" from which any
person deemed dangerous were to be excluded, expelled, or restricted, in
order to prevent espionage and sabotage.

In essence, the Order authorized

the evacuation of some 112,000 West Coast Japanese, two-thirds of whom were
American citizens, to relocation centers lOO "in the desert country of
California, Arizona, Idaho, Utah, Colorado, and Wyoming and in the delta
areas of Arkansas, where they were put in charge of a presidentially created
civilian agency called the War Relocation Authority." 101 The essential
paragraphs o'f the document read as follows:
Whereas the successful prosecution of the war requires
every possible protection against espionage and against
sabotage to national-defense material, national-defense
premises, and national-defense utilities ....
lOOc. Herman Pritchett, The 'American Constitution (New York:
Hill Book Company, Inc., 1959), p. 362.
,

McGraw-

lOlEdward S. Corwin, The President, Office and Powers (New York:
New York University Press, 1957), p. 256.
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Now, therefore, by virtue of the authority vested in
me as President of the United States, and Commander
in Chief of the Army and Navy, I hereby authorize and
direct the Secretary of War, and the military commanders
whom he may from time to time designate, whenever he
or any designated commander deems such action necessary
or desirable, to prescribe military areas in such
places and of such extent as he or the appropriate
military commander may determine, from which any or
all persons may be excluded, and with respect to which,
the right of any person to enter, remain in, or leave
shall be subject to whatever restrictions the Secretary
of War or the appro~riate military commander may impose
in his discreti~n. 02
.
A Congressional Resolution of March 21, 1942, made it a misdemeanor
to knowingly enter, remain in, or leave prescribed military areas'' contrary
to the orders of the commanding officer of the area. 103 This Executive
11

Order, which in perspective seems to have been wholly unnecessary, has been
.

.

called by Professor Corwin 11 the most drastic invasion. of the rights of
citizens of the United States by their own government that has thus far
occurred in the history .of our nation.i• 104
The first case to reach the Supreme Court challenging the right
of the government to override the customary civil rights of the JapaneseAmericans was Hirabayashi v. United States.

The circumstances of this

particular case provided an opportunity for the Court to avoid the more
102Federal Register, Vol. VI,, No. 38, pp. 1407-1528.
103 U.S., Statutes at Large, LVI, 173..
[

104Edward S. Corwin, Total War and the Constitution (New York:

Alfred A.

l--K-n-o-pf_,__
19_4_7_),__p_._9_1_.___________________________________________~
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difficult constitutional question of whether the procedures were contrary
to due process, or to justify them on the ground that they were a 'military.
necessity.

Shortly before the evacuation program had been undertaken, the

Army ·adopted a curfew regulation requiring all aliens and persons of
Japanese ancestry to be in their residences between 8:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m.
'

.

Hirabayashi, and American-born citizen of alien Japanese parents, was convicted of failure both to .pbey the curfew and to report for registration for
evacuation.

The Court upheld the curfew regulations as a valid military

measure to prevent espionage and sabotage.
Whatever views we may entertain regarding the loyalty
to this country of the citizens of Japanese ancestry, ·
we cannot reject as unfounded the judgment of the
military authorities and of Congress that there were
disloyal members of that population, whose number and
strength could not be precisely and quickly ascertained. We cannot say that the war-making branches of the
Government did not have ground for believing that in
a critical hour such persons could not readily be
isolated and separately dealt with, and constituted a
menace to the national defense and safety .... 105
While emphas~zing that distinctions based on ancestry were "by their very
nature "odius to a free people" the Court nonetheless felt "that in time of
war residents having ethnic affiliations with an invading enemy may be a
greater source of danger than those of a different ancestry." 106
The next case to reach the Court was Korematsu v. United States.

105Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
106 Ibid.' p. 81.
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.

Korematsu, and Amerfcan citizen of Japanese ancestry, remained in California
after it had been ordered cleared of all persons of Japanese descent by
Executive Order, itself confirmed by an Act of Congress.
leave and was convicted under the law.

In an

o~inion

He refused to

written by Mr. Justice

Black, the Court held.that this was a valid exercise of the war power.
Korematsu was not excluded from the Military Area because
of hostility to him or his race. He was excluded because
we are at war with the Japanese Empire, because the
properly constituted military authorities feared an
invasion of our West Coast and felt constrained to take
proper security measures, because they decided that the
military urgency of the situation demanded that all
citizens of Japanese ancestry be segregated from the
West Coast temporarily, and finally, because Congress,
reposing its confidence in this time of war in our
military leaders--as inevitably it must--detennined
that they should have the powe~ to do just this. There
was evidence of disloyalty on the part of some, the
military authorities considered that the need for
action was great, and time Was short. · We cannot--by
availing ourselves of the calm perspective of hindsight--now say that at that time these actions were
.unjustified. 107
The third case to reach the Court and resolved on the same day as
Korematsu v. United States was Ex parte Endo.· Miss Mitsuye Endo, an American
citizen of Japanese ancestry, with established loyalty to the United States,
. was a permanent employee in the California Civil Service.

Under the order

of relocation Miss Endo was evacuated from Sacramento to a relocation center
near Tule Lake, California. The Court held that an American citizen of

107Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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Japanese ancestry whose loyalty to this country had been established could
not constitutionally be held in a war relocation center but must be uncon-

!f

ditionally released.

The government-had allowed persons to leave relocation

t

l

centers under Conditions designed to prevent a di SOrderly mi grati On Of UnII

wanted people to unprepared communities. 11 The Court held that the purpose of
the evacuation and detention program was to protect the war effort against
sabotage and espionage.

'';. person who is concededly loyal presents no

problems of espionage or sabotage ....
spy or a saboteur. 11

He who is loyal is by definition not a

It follows, therefore, that the authority to detain a

citizen of Japanese ancestry ends when his loyalty is established, and to be
otherwise held would be not on grounds of military necessity, but on grounds
of race. lOB
The Court refused to rule on the

basi~

constitutional issues of

relocation, confinement, and segregation programs for the Japanese-Americans
in the above cases.

Undoubtedly the Court was influenced by what it felt

was a feeling of military necessity on the part of those in charge at the
time.

The racial aspect of the entire program made the whole thing most

unfortunate.

108Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 2a3 (1944).
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TRADING WITH THE ENEMY AND ESPIONAGE

The Constitution empowers Congress to regulate interstate and
foreign commerce. 109 In so doing, Congress may make such regulations as it
deems fit toward the crippling of the enemy and the winning of the war.

!

Event~

leading up to the War of 1812 prompted Congress to exercise this power, and
it passed The Embargo Acteof December 22, 1807, which in effect was an Act

laying embargo on all ships and vessels in the ports and harbors of the
United States.
Be it enacted that an embargo be, and hereby is laid
on all ships and vessels in the ports and places within the limits or jurisdiction of the United States,
cleared or not cleared, bound to any foreign port or
place; and that no clearance be furnished to any ship
or vessel bound to such foreign port or place, except
vessels under the immediate direction ·of the President
of the United States .... 110
Following this, and several other Embargo Acts, Congress passed the
Non-Intercourse
Act on March 1, 1809, interdicting the commercial trade
...
between the United States and Great Britain and France as well as their
dependent territories.
·... the entrance of the harbors and waters of the United
· States ... be interdicted to all public ships and vessels
belonging to Great Britain or France .... And if any

'

r

109u.s., Constitution, Art. 1, Sec. 8, Cl. 3.

llOu.s., Statutes at Large, II, 451.
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ship or vessel ... shall enter any harbor or waters within the jurisdiction of the United States ... it shall be
lawful for the President of the United States, or such
other person as he shall deem necessary, to compel such
ship or vessel to depart .... 111
The use of presidential powers under the Commander-in-Chief clause
are virtually unlimited

du~ng

times of crisis.

President Lincoln made use

of these powers in 1861 when he set forth his proclamation declaring a
blockade on the southern

p~rts

of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida,

Mississippi, Louisia~a, and Texas. 112
The constitutional power of the President to proclaim a blockade
of enemy ports was upheld without exception.

In The Amy Warwick case, the

district court of Massachusetts ruled that the President had 11 plenary 11
power as Commander in Chief to proclaim and to

enf~rce

a ·blockade when war

de facto existed without the necessity of a prior declaration of war by
Congress.
There can be no doubt of the right of the President
to•make maritime capt~res and submit them to judicial
investigation .... Some have thought that it was to
be deemed enemy's country, because of the proclamation of the President. It seems rather that the
proclamation and the blockade are to be upheld as
legal a~~ valid because the territory is that of an
3
. enemy.

..

lllu.s., Statutes at Large, II, 528.
112Richardson, Vol. VI, pp. 14-15.
113The Amy Warwick, 1 Fed. Cas. 799, 804, 805 (D. Mass., 1862), No. 341.
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When the above case as well as others reached the Supreme Court on
appeal, the Court held that the President by virtue of his power as Chief
Executive and Commander in Chief is entitled to treat a region known to be in
insurrection as enemy country and thereby strip all its inhabitants of their
constitutional rights.

President Lincoln's Declaration of Blockade for

Confederate ports was valid on the basis that the rebellion was a state of
war under domestic and in'iernational law.

The Court further ruled that this
was a political question to be decided by the President--not the Courts. 114
A number of Supreme Court cas.es decided after the war strictly construed the President's power as Commander in Chief to license trading with
the enemy during the Civil War. 115
In The Sea Lion decided in 1867, the Court held that under the
original Act of June 13, 1861, issued by President Lincoln on the blockade,
the President could grant or authorize a permit to pass through the blockade .
. The Sea Lion, holding a license issued by a special agent of the Treasury
Department who was acting under the orders of the commanding general of the
Union Army in New Orleans, broke the blockade, and was captured for condemnation as a prize of war.

The Court further held that the license held by

the Sea Lion was null and void and that the ship and its cargo could validly
be seized as a prize of war as the' license had not been issued by the

ll4The Prize Cases, 2 Black 635 (1863).
115schubert, p. 221.
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The Court held the same view in Coppell v. Hall.

Certificates

were being issued by the British consul to protect cotton from seizure by the
Union forces before it could be transported to New Orleans and then exported
to England.

The Court decision in this

~ase

reads as follows:

The military orders set forth in the record were unwarranted and void. The President alone could license trade
with the rebel territory, and when thus licensed; it
could be carried only in conformity to regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury (which had been
approved by the President). The subject was wholly
beyond the sphere of the powers and duties of the
military authorities. l 17
Under the provisions of the Trading with the Enemy Act of October
6, 1917, the President was given powers over importation and exportation to
enemy countries except under such regulations as he might choose to make.
Be it enacted ... that it shall be unlawful for any
person in the United States, except with the license
of the President, granted to such person, or to the
enemy, or ally of the enemy, as provided in this
Act, to trade, or attempt to trade either directly
or- indirectly, with, to, or from, or for, or on
account of, or on behalf of, or for the benefit of,
any other person, with knowledge or reasonable
cause to believe that such other person is an enemy
or ally of enemy, or is conducting or taking part
·in such trade, directly or indirectly for, or on
· account of, or on behalf of gr for the benefit of,
. an enemy or ally of enemy. 11
116rhe Sea Lion, 5 Wallace 630, 647 (1867).
117coppellv. Hall, 7 Wallace 542, 556 (1869).
l~8u.s., Statutes at Large, Vol. XL, 441.

':
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Referring to President Wilson's authoritative use of the power
given to him under the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 Berdahl elaborates
by stating:
By virtue of this authority, President Wilson at various
times during the war proclaimed an embargo on long lists
of articles, and prohibited the importation of other
articles, except under a system of licenses which he
placed under the supervision of the War Trade Board. In
this way he was able to exercise complete control over
the foreign tra!e of the United States during the period
of the war, and thus to prevent supplies from reaching
the enemy, either directly or through neutral channels. 11 9
Following closely upon the heels -Of.the Trading with the Enemy Act
was the Espionage Act of May 16, 1918.

This Act was far more drastic than

the Act of June 15, 1917, and made the Sedition Act of 1798 1ook very mild.
Under Attorney-General Palmer the Espionage Act was drastically enforced,
and freedom of spee.ch and of the press temporarily disappeared.
Be it enacted that ... whoever, when the United States
is at war, shall willfully utter, print, write, or
publish any disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive
language about the form of government of the United
States, or the Constitution of the United States, ...
shall be punished by a fine of not more than $10,000
or imprisynment for not more than twenty years, or
both.... 20
The most famous case under these laws was Schenck v. United States.
Schenck was the general secretary,of the Socialist Party.

ll9Berdahl, p. 210.
120u.s., Statutes at Large, XL, 553.

He sent out about

r.------------------------------------------------------------------....
~·
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15,000 leaflets to men who had been called to military service, urging them
to assert their opposition to the Conscription Act.
three counts under the Espionage Act of 1917:

(1)

He was indicted on
Conspiracy to cause

insubordination in the military service of the United States, (2)

Using the

mails to send matter declared to be nonmailable by the Espionage Act, and
(3)

The unlawful use of the mails for the transmission of the same matter

as mentioned above.

Speaking for a unanimous Court, Chief Justice Holmes

was faced with the problem of squaring the Espionage Act with the lst
Amendment which states, "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press .... 11

Holmes ruled that Congress had the con-

stitutional power to prevent speech and publication that constituted a "clear
and present danger." Schenck's activities, Holmes ruled,. did in fact constitute such ~ danger. 121
A week later the Court decided the case of Socialist leader, Eugene
V. Debs.

Debs made a speech before the Ohio state convention of the Socialist

Party at Canton, and was subsequently arrested.

The Court held that the

..

delivery of a speech with such words and in such circumstances that the
probable effect would be to prevent recruiting--and with that intent--is
punishable under the Espionage Act of 1917 as amended in 1918. 122
Nine months later the Court decided Abrams v. United States.

12lschenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
122Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919).

In
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this case, Abrams and four other Russians were indicted for conspiring to
violate the Espionage Act.

They published two leaflets that denounced the

efforts of capitalist nations to interfere with the Russian Revolution,
criti.cized the President and the plutocratic gang in Washington for sending
American troops to Russia, and urged workers producing
United States not to betray their Russian comrades.

muni~ions

in the

Without mentioning the

clear and present danger ijoctrine the Court found that the defendants had
intended to 11 urge, ·incite, and advocate 11 curtailment of production necessary
to the war.

The Court reasoned that the 11 men must be held to have.intended,

and to be accountable for, the effects which their acts were likely to
produce. 11 - 123
Only one case of espionage, that of Hartzel v. United States was
decided by the Supreme Court during World War IL

Hartzel was prosecuted for

publishing and mailing 11 scurrilous and vitriolic attacks on the English, the
Jews and the President of the United States 11 to a carefully selected mailing
list.

The Court held that two major elements are necessary to constitute an

offense under the Espionage Act.
The first element is a subjective one, consisting of
a specific intent ... to cause insubordination or dis.loyalty in the anned forces .... The second element
is an objective one, consisting of a clear and present
danger that the activit1es in question will bring
about the substantive evils which Congress has a right

123Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).

l-------------------
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to prevent .... Both el~ments must be proved by the
Government beyond a reasonable doubt. ·124
The Court failed to find the requisite intent and ruled that a crime had not
been committed under the statute.
Nearly all the cases tried under these Acts by the Supreme Court
have been upheld, and the laws judged to be constitutional, thus enabling
the President as Commander in Chief to exercise a complete control over all

•

business having any relation to war needs, which in modern times includes
practically the entire business life of the nation, as well as complete
control over freedom of speech and the press during times of crisis.

124Hartzel v. United States, 322 U.S. 680 {1944).

I.

.

'

r.

t_________________________________________________.

•

THE EXECUTIVE AND THE DOMESTIC SCENE
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SEIZURE ANO REGULATION OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISE

The power of the President as Commander in Chief to confiscate
citiz.en's property during time of crisis has increased immensely since World
War I, due to the demands that war and its aftermath have made on the nation's
economy.
During World Wa& I, President Wilson, acting with statuatory
authority conferred on him by Congress under the National Defense Act of
August 29, 1916, issued a proclamation permitting the seizure of various
transportation utilities including all railroads in the United States and
the terminals in seaports for ocean-going vessels as well as telephone, telegraph, and the commercial cable line .
... I, Woodrow Wilson, President of the· United
States, under and by virtue of the powers vested
in me ... take possession and assume control at
12 o'clock noon on the 28th day of December,
1917, of each and every system of transportation
... consisting of railroads, and owned or controlled
systems of coastwise and inland transportation ...
al so terminals, terminal companies, ... sleeping
and parlor cars, private cars and private car
lines, elevators, warehouses, telephone and
telegraph lines ... to the end that such systems
of transportation be utilized for the transfer
·and transportation of troops, war material and
equipment .... It is hereby directed that the
possession, control, operation and utilization
of such transportation systems hereby by me
undertaken sha 11 be exercised by and through

...
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'·
William G. McAdoo, who is hereby appointed an9
designated Director-General of Railroads .... 25
Professor Schubert states that there were numerous cases decided in
the state and lower federal courts dealing with the validity of the Director
General s orders.
1

The majority of cases decided in the state courts denied

his authority whereas the majority of those cases decided in the federal
courts upheld as constitutional and valid the authority of the Director
General s orders. 126
•
1

In both Rhodes v. Tatum and Dahn v. McAdoo, the Court held that
"Any order issued by Mr. McAdoo as Director General must be considered as
the order of the President." l27
The Court made the same ruling .in Mardis v.

Hine~

in 1920.

It said

that "the orders of the Director General were in the sense of the Act of
1918, the orders of the President. 11 128
The most controversial aspects of federal control by the President
came under the heading of interim rate-making powers in setting rate
~

schedules for intrastate as well as interstate commerce.

In reality, the

125Ray S. Baker and William E. Dodd (eds.), The Public Papers of Woodrow
Wilson, War and Peace, Vol. I (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1927), pp ..
143-144.
1 26schtibert, p. 242 ..
127Rhodes v. Tatum, 206 S.W. 114, 118 (Texas, 1918), and Dahn v. McAdoo,
256 F. 549 (N.D~ Iowa, E.D. at Dubuque, 1919).
128Mardis v. Hines, 267 F. 171, 173 (8 C.C.A., 1920).
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Director General in his order of May 25, 1918, had set the rates.

The North

Dakota State Utilities Commission on appeal to the state Supreme Court was
granted a writ of mandamus ordering McAdoo to authorize only the lower rates
that.were previously approved by the Utilities Commission for intrastate
hauling in North Dakota rather than the rates as set by McAdoo in his general
order.

The United States Supreme Court reversed the decision, however, and

in so doing upheld the power of the President and his delegation of power to
Director General McAdoo, to determine all rate schedules for railroads for
the duration of the war emergency. 129
Similan.legislation was passed by a joint resolution of Congress on
July 16, 1918, and President Wilson in his proclamation of July 22, 1918,
used -the authority empowered to him by Congress, assumed possession and control over the operation of all telephone and telegraph systems throughout
the United States.

Wilson ditected the Postmaster General to assume control
and set a rate schedule. 130 The facts and results in Dakota Central
Telephone Company v. South Dakota ex rel Payne are basically identical to
those in the Northern Pacific Railroad Company case cited above.

The

South Dakota Supreme Court issued an order directing the utility companies
· not to put into effect the higher schedule of rates for intrastate teleph?ne

129Northern Pacific Railroad Com an v. North Dakota ex rel William
Langer, 250 U.S. 135 1919 .
130schubert, p. 242.
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service as established by the Postmaster General.

The United States Supreme

Court reversed the decision, as in the Railroad Case, on the basis that the
joint resolution was constitutional, the acts of the Postmaster General under
that ·delegation. were the same in legal effect as though performed by the
President himself, and the judiciary had no power to review the wisdom or
necessity of the determination of the particular rate schedule here
involved. 131

•

During World War II most seizures of industrial and commercial
properties were made by the President under Section 3 of the War Labor
Disputes Act of 1943.

The Act authorized the President to seize any 11 plant,

mine or facility equipped for war production which was threatened by a strike
that might unduly impede or delay the war effort. 11 The Act further enjoined
the President with the authority to di'rect the management of the enterprises
until such time as the labor dispute was settled. 132
Be it enacted that ... the power of the President under
the foregoing provisions of this section to take
irrtnediate possession of any plant upon a failure to
comply with any such provisions, and the authority
granted by this section for the use and operation by
the United States or in its interests of any plant
of which possession is so taken, shall also apply as
hereinafter provided to any plant equipped for the
·manufacture, production, or mining of any articles or
materials which may be required for the national defense
or which may be useful 1n connection therewith. Such

~

[.

l

I

!'·
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I·

131 Dakota Central Tele hone
250 U.S. 163, 184

l·--____

South Dakota ex rel Pa ne,

1919 .

1_3_2_u_.s_._,_s_t_a_t_ut_e_s_a_t__1_ar_g_e_,_L_I_I_I_,_1_6_3_.__________________________....,.
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service as established by the Postmaster General.

The United States Supreme

Court reversed the decision, as in the Railroad Case, on the basis that the
joint resolution was constitutional, the acts of the Postmaster General under
that delegation were the same in legal effect as though performed by the
President himself, and the judiciary hadno power to review the wisdom or
necessity of the determination of the particular rate schedule here
involved. 131

•

During World War II most seizures of industrial and commercial
properties were made by the President under Section 3 of the War Labor
Disputes Act of 1943. The Act authorized the President to seize any "plant,
mine or facility equipped for war production which was threatened by a strike
that might unduly impede or

~elay

the war effort." The Act further enjoined

the President with the authority to direct the management of the enterprises
until such time as the labor dispute was settled. 132
Be it enacted that ... the power of the President under
.the foregoing provisions of this section to take
imtnediate possession of any plant upon a failure to
comply with any such provisions, and the authority
granted by this section for the use and operation by
the United States or in its interests of any plant
of which possession is so taken, shall also apply as
hereinafter provided to any plant equipped for the
·manufacture, production, or mining of any articles or
materials which may be required for the national defense
or which may be useful ,n connection therewith. Such
Dakota ex rel Pa ne,
132
.
Statutes at Large, LI II, l 63.
. U.S.,
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. power and authority may be exerci seci oy the President
through such department or agency of the Government
as he may designate, and may be exercised with respect
to any such plant, whenever the President finds, after
investigation, and proclaims that there is an interruption of the operation of such plant as a result of a
strike or other labor disturbance, that the national
defense program will be unduly impeded or·delayed by
such interruption, and that the exercise of such power
and authority is necessary to insure the opera ti on of 133
such plant in the interest of the national defense •..
Those cases that-reached the Supreme Court did so after the
I
.hostiTlt'kls ceased. The first case to reach the Court was Ken-Rad Tube and
Lamp Corporation v. Badeau. Badeau, a colonel in the Army, assumed possesi"!'on
and management of the Ken_-Rad Company in comp 11 ance with the President's order
of Apr1l 13, 1"944. Ken-Rad contended that the President's order directing

··--"

the setzure of the plants was based on the fear of threatened strikes
resulting from

t~e

fact of their refusal to comply with an allegedly invalid

order of the War Labor

1

B~ard,

and therefore, the President's order was also

invalid. The federal district court h.eld that:
The record fails to disclose any grounds upon which the
Court could find that the President, in issuing the
order" acted arbitrarily or without cause. He was not
bound by the findings of the War Labor Board. Even
thougn they might have been·based upon erroneous pro_.~ -cedure or wrongful construction of facts, the Pres ident may have had other facts upon which he determined--_/
his course ..• it is our Judgment that section 9 doeS'~----not ·confine the President to any one field of infonnation
but that he may make his own independent investigation
and, subject to the determi'nation .by the Courts that
133Ibid., p. 163.

I
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his action was not arbitrary, may act to prevent a
cessation of operations of any plant or business or
other agency which might be utilized to contribute
to the war effort. We further conclude that without
an Act of Congress there was sufficient authority by
the terms of the Constitution itself to justify the
action of the President in this case •.. when war has
been declared and is actually existing, his functions
as Conmander in Chief become of the highest importance
and his operations in that connection are entirely
beyond the control of the legislature. There devolves
upon, by virtue of his office, a solemn responsibility
to preserve the-nation and it is our judgment that there
is specifically granted. to him authorityrto utilize
all resources of the country to that end. 134
In 1944 under Executive Order 9508 issued by President Roosevelt,
the Secretary of War took possession of and directed the operation of
Montgomery Ward's plant and facilities in Chicago. ·The Chicago Federal
District Court ruled that Montgomery Ward was engaged in retail selling and
distribution, not production and since the War Lab9r Disputes Act pertained
only to war production, the seizure of Ward's ras an unconstitutional use of
I

the President's powers as Conmander in. Chief. The government succeeded in
getting the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals -to rule that Ward's was "a

.

plant engaged in war production" under the Failr Labor Standards Act of 1938
which stated that 'Produced' means producing, manufacturing, mining, handling,
or transporting, or in any other manner working on such goods, 3r...-ilf-any
..... -'

process or occupation necessary tb the production thereof, in any State. The
134Ken-Rad Tube &Lamp Corporation v. Badeau, 55 F. Supp. 193i 197-198
(W.D. Ky., OWensboro D., 1944).
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district court with directions to dismiss as moot due to the fact that the
President had returned Ward's properties before the Supreme Court had reached
the case on its docket. 136
In United States v. United Mine

Wor~ers

of America the Court ruled

on the'i>resident's constitutional powers to convert'private property to
public uses in time of war. The Court held that "in October, 1946, tne United
States was in possession of,· and operating, the major portion of the country's
bituminous coal mines.

(1) The United States had taken possession of the

mines pursuant to Executive Order 9728 of May 21, 1946, 11 FR 5593, in whtch
I

the President, after dete·rmining that labor disturbances were interrupting
the pn:1duction of bituminous coal necessary for the operation of the
national economy during the transition from·war to peace, directed the
Secretary .of the Interior to take possession of and operate the mines and to
negoti~e

with representatives of the mines concerning the terms and con-

. ditions of employment. The President's action was taken under.....--the-Constitution, as President of the United States and Commander in Chief of the A".'my

135Montg0mery Ward &Company v. United States, 326 U.S. 690 (1945).

- 63 · and Navy .• and by virtue of the authority conferred upon him by the War
Labor Disputes Act. 136
The development and use of presidential power as Commander in Chief
to assume temporary control and possession of private
enterprise was halted
' .
,/

by the Supreme Court's decision in the Youngstown steel case of 1952.

In

the latter part of 1951 a dispute arose between the steel companies and their
employees over terms and.1tonditions that should be included in new collective
bargaining agreements.
dispute.

Long continued conferences failed to settle the

On December 18, 1951, the employees' representative of the United

States Workers of America gave notice of an intention to strike when the
agreements expired on December 31. The Federal Mediation and Conciliation
.,,,.~--··

Service intervened. but unsuccessfully, and President Trl.111an then referred
the dispute to the Federal Wage Stabilization Board to investigate and make
recommendations for fair, and equitable tenns of settlement. This failed, and
the Union gave notice of a nationwide strike called to begin at 12:01 a.m.,
I

April 9. The. indispensability of steel led.President Truman to believe that
the proposed strike would immediately jeopardize our national defense, and
he issued an Executive Order directing Secretary of Commerce Sawyer to take
poss es s ion

af

the steel mills and keep them running.

..----··. ·-

In a 6 to
. 3--vote the
..... .-·"
,.

Court ruled that the power of the President to issue such an order must stem

l36united States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258, 262
(1947).
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from an Act of Congress or from the Constitution itself. Only two statutes
authorize seizure under cer;tain conditions, but the government admitted these
conditions were not met, since ·the production involved was too cumbersome and
time-co~suming.

Moreover, in the consideration of the Taft-Hartley Act,

Congress rejected an amendment authorizing governmental seizures in an
emergency.· Nor is there any provision in the Constitution that would warrant
this seizure. As Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, the President still
I

has no right to seize private prqperty to keep labor disputes from stopping
production. This was a matter for Congress only, not for military authorities. Neither does the Constitution pennit the President to legislate--a
·function which belongs only to Congress, in good times or in bad times. This
seiiure order cannot stand. 137
Professor Schubert best sums up the Presjdent's seizure powers when
he says:
The question remains whether the President does not
still have a choice among alternative procedures.
Certainly the Supreme Court would uphold his selection if he acted under circumstances which the Court
would accept as time of war, and the Youngstown case
is the only instance in our entire history when the
Supreme Court failed to follow the leydership of the
Commander in Chief in such a matter. 38
.
137voungstown Sheet &Tube Company v. Charles Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579
(1952).
138schubert,_ p. 251.
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Schubert goes on to say that "the future will find the Youngstown decision

.

being confined to its very special facts, something to be reprinted in casebooks for the enlightenment of students of constitutional law but not a
in. a moment of national
precedent which the Court is obliged to take seriously
'./
crisis ... l39

l39tbid., p. 251.

•

•

I

- 66 HABEAS CORPUS AND MARTIAL LAW
The provision in the Constitution pennitting the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus "when in cases of rebellion or invasion
the public safety may -require it" 140 indicates tha~ the taking of extraordinary measures in cases of such emergency was· clearly recognized as
necessary and proper by

t~e

framers of the

Constitu~ion.

however, that there was some objec1'.ion to this
'

cla~se

It must be noted,

at the time.

In a

I

letter to Madison, Jefferson protested as follows:
Why suspend Hab. Corp. in insurrections & rebellions?
... If publick safety requires that the government
should have a man imprisoned on less probable testimony in those than in other emergencies; let him be
taken & tried, retaken &retried, while the necessity
continues, only giving him redress against the
government for damages. Examine the history of
England. See how few of the cases of the suspension
of the Habeas Corpus law have been worthy of that
suspension. They have been either real treasons
wherein the parties might as well have been charged
at once, or sham plots where it was shameful they
should ever have been suspected. ·vet for the few
cases wherein the suspension of the hab. corp. has
done real good, that operation is now becoming
habitual, &the minds of the nation almylf prepared
to live under its constant suspension.
140 u.s., Constitution, Art. 'l, Sec. 9, Cl. 2.
. · 141Jul1an P. Boyd (ed.), The Papers of Thomas Jeffersgn, Vol. 13
(New Jersey,: Princeton University Press, .1956), p. · 442.
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The Constitution is notably silent as to who determines when and
where an emergency has arisen and who determines the suspension of the writ-Congress, The President, or the courts. The general consensus has been, by
it placement in the Constitution inmediately following the delegated
powers of Congress, that this power belongs to Congress. 142 However, with
the outbreak of the Civil War, this general consensus was disregarded by
8

President Lincoln when he assumed the responsibility of authorizing General
I

Scott. the conmanding general of the Army, to suspend the writ •

.

You are engaged in suppressing an insurrection against
the laws of the United States. If at any point on
or in the vicinity of any military line which is now
or which shall be used between the city of Philadelphia and the city of Washington you find resistance which renders it necessary to suspend the writ
of habeas corpus for the public safety, you personally,
or through the officer in conmand at the point where
re~isty~§e occurs, are a~thorized to suspend that
wr1t.
I

On July 2, 1861, this

au~horization

was extended to «over the line between

New York and Washington. 144
The first case to come before the Supreme Court challenging the
. suspension of the writ

~as

Ex parte Merryman. John Merryman, a Maryland

142Kallenbach, p. 545.
143 Richardson, Vol. VI, p. 18.
1441bid •• p. 19.
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secessionist sympathizer residing in Maryland, was apprehended by the military and placed in custody at Fort McHenry for attempting to hinder the
success of the Northern cause. Merryman inmediately appealed to Chief
Justice Taney for a writ of habeas corpus. Taney issued the writ, directed
to General Cadwalader who was in conmand of the fort.

The general refused

to honor the writ on the grounds that he was authorized by the President to
suspend the writ of habels corpus, but that he would seek further instruc1

tions. Taney then issued a writ of contempt against General Cadwalader and
sent a United States marshal to serve it. The marshal reported to Taney that
he had not been allowed to enter the outer gate of the fort, although he had
sent in his card, and tha·t he had not been able to serve the writ. Taney
then delivered an opinion holding the President's power to suspend the writ
null and void on the grounds that only Congress can suspend the writ since
the provision appears in,the Article of the Constitution dealing with Congress, and in a list of limitations on Congress, and further that a military
\

officer cannot arrest a person not subject to the rules and articles of
war, _except in the aid of. ci_. vi 1 authority when the i ndi vi dua 1 has committed
an offense against the United States.

In such a case the military officer
__.-

must deliver the prisoner inmediately to civil authority to be.Aeaft with
<t·

according to the law.

.--

President Lincoln ignored the ruling, but Mer.ryman was

- later released from military confinement and turned over to civil authorities. 145
145Ex - -. arte Herr an, 17 Fed. Cas. 144, No. 9, 487 (1861).
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Lincoln responded to the Merryman case of July 4, 1S61,· in his
message to Congress. Posing the query, "Are all the laws but one to go unexecuted, and the Government itself go to pieces lest that one be violated"?,
he went on to say:
Now it is insisted that Congress, and not the Executive,
is vested with this power (to suspend the writ); but _
the Constitution itself is silent as to which or who is
to exercise the power; and as the provision was plainly
made for·a dangerous emergency, it cannot be believed
the framers of the instrument intended that in every
case the danger should run its course until Congress
could be called together, the very assembling of which
might be prevented, as was intended in this case, by
the rebellion.... Whether there shall be any legislation on the subject, and, if any, what, is ~~gmitted
entirely to the better judgment of Congress.
~rch

3, 1863, Congress passed the Habeas Corpus Act which not

only authorized the President to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, but it
also legalized his past acts. 147 After Congress passed the Habeas Corpus
Act, President Lincoln iSsued another proclamation regarding the suspension of
the writ of habeas corpus, citing the ·Act

a~

the basis of his authority to do

so ••
. .• Whereas by statute which was approved ... the Senate
and House of Representatives of the United States in
Congress assembled that during the present insurrect.~ion. ,.-·
the President of the United States, whenever in his
judgment the public safety may require, is authorize
.
to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
146Richardson, Vol. VI, p. 25.
147u.S., Statutes at Large, XII. 755.
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I

in any case throughout the United St,ates or any part
thereof; ... Now, therefore, I, Abraham Lincoln,
·
President of the United States, do hereby proclaim
and make known to all whom it may concern that the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended
throughout the United States in the several cases before mentioned, and that this suspension will continue
throughout the duration of the said rebellion or
until this proclamation shall, by a subsequent one to
be issued by the Presl~snt of the United States, be ·
modified or revoked.
Several state csurt and lower federal court rulings were made on the

suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, however, none of the adverse rulings
reached the United States Supreme Court. ·In most

instance~

these state

· court and lower federal court rulings upheld the validity of the President's
proclamation of September 15, 1863, as well as the congressional statute of
March 3, 1863, on the grounds that both the statute and the proclamation were
. elements in a constitutional congressional plan of ,contingency legislation.
They further held that t~ere had been no delegation of legislative power~ 149
Subsequent Supreme Court rulings on the suspension of the writ of
\

habeas corpus were taken up in those cases dealing with martial law and
subjection of civilians to military trials. l SO

148Richardson, Vol. VI, pp. 170-171.
149 In re Fagan, 8 Fed. Cas. '947 (D. Mass., 1863), No. 4604; In re Dunn,
8 Fed. Cas. 93 (S.D.N~Y., 1863), No. 417l; In re Oliver, 17 Wis. 681 (1864).
l 50Ka 11 enbach, p. 547.

- 71 The suspension of the writ of habeas corpus merely means that it
is possible to make military arrests and detention of individuals without
~r·

interference by civil courts. Much more serious consideration is given to
the question of the possibility of interfering in the constitutional rights
of citizens under the proclamation of martial law. l51
According to the Manual for Courts-Martial, martial law is
"military power exercised tin time of war, insurrection, or rebellion, in
I

parts of the country retaining their allegiance, ahd over persons and things
not ordinarily subjected to it." 152 "Martial law," according to the.
Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies,"is simply military
authority" exercised in accordance with the laws and usages of war •••• " 153
The most noteworthy controversies were first provided during the
Civil War when President Lincoln issued his proclamation of September 24,
!

1862. Aside from suspending the writ of habeas corpus for those individuals
.in the North who were interfering with the war effort, he also made them
subject to martial law.
Now, therefore,. be it ordered, first, that during the
existing insurrection, and as a necessary measure for
suppressing the same, all rebels and insurgents, their
aiders and abettors, within the United States, and all
151 Ibid., p. 547.
152Manual for Courts-Martial, p. 5.
15Jwar of the Rebe 11 ion •••. , p. 146.

-·
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persons discouraging volunteer enlistments, resisting
militia drafts, or guilty of any disloyal practice
affording aid and comfort to rebels against the authority
of the United States, shall be subject to martial law and
liable to trial and punishment by courts-martial or
military conmi s s ions •..• " 154
The first and only case to reach the Supreme Court in which the
trial of civilians by mi 1i tary courts-martial ·or commissions was challenged
was that of Ex parte Vallt11digham. Vallandigham was

a~

agitator and peace

democrat from Ohio who had been outspoken in his opposition to the Civil War
'

and the war efforts. He was tried by a military commission, convicted and
sentenced to be imprisoned for the duration of the war. He appealed to
the Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus. The Court held that it was
without jurisdiction.

Vallandigham's recourse to the federal courts via

habeas corpus had been cut off by the suspension of the writ. The Court
further ruled that the· authority of a military conmission is not subject to
appeal to, or reversal by, any civil court. Since the Supreme Court had no
·original jurisdiction to issue writs of' habeas corpus, it had no jurisdiction
to hear Vallandigham's case, and the case was dismissed. 155
A year after the'civil War was over, the Court ruled on Ex parte
Milligan. Milligan, a civilian, was arrested by order of General_ Hovey who
COlllTlanded the military district cff Indiana. Milligan was tried by

154Richardson, Vol. VI, p. 98.
155Ex ,parte Vallandigham, 1 Wallace 243 q86~). ,
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Milligan. Milligan, a civilian, was arrested by order of General_.Hovey who
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154Richardson, Vol. ,VI, p. 98.
155Ex parte Vallandigham, 1 Wallace 243 (1863).

- 73 comm.i ss ion, found gui 1ty of i ni ti ati ng insurrection and of various treasonable and disloyal practices, and sentenced to be hanged on May 19, 1865.
Milligan appealed to the Circuit Court in Indiana for a writ of habeas corpus
on the grounds that the military proceedings were unconstitutional and
further claimed his rights to a trial by jury as guaranteed by the Constitution. The Circuit Court asked the Supreme Court for its opinion. The
Supreme Court stated that 'f!very trial involves the exercise of judicial
(

power and part of the judicial power of the country was conferred upon the
military conmission because the Constitution expressly vests it "in one
supreme court and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to
time ordain and establish." The military cannot justify action on the mandate of the President because he is controlled by law, and has his appropriate sphere of duty, which is to execute, not
stated that in times of

~rave

ma~e,

the laws. The Court

emergencies the Constitution allows the govern-

.

ment to make arrests without a writ of habeas corpus but it goes no further.
In other words a citizen may be tried by means other than conmon law.
·The Court further stated that martial law can be applied only when
there is real necessity, such as'during an invasion that would effectually
,.._...-'

close the courts and civil administration. However, as long

a~the-civil
/~

'" '
courts are operating, as they were
in this case, the military tribunal

not have any legal power and authority to try and punish this man--the

~id

- 74 accused is entitled to a civil trial by jury. 156
There is a considerable parallel between Lincoln's military
commissions and the situation which prevailed in Hawaii during the greater
part of World War II.

Immediately following the attack on Pearl Harbor,

Governor Poindexter of the Territory of Hawaii proclaimed martial law,
suspended the writ of habeas corpus, closed the local courts, and turned
over the powers of governnl!nt to the commanding general of the United States
I.

Anny in Hawaii. The President approved the governor's actions, and the
military ruled Hawaii until October 24, 1944. 157
In February 1944, Duncan, a civilian shipfitter employed by the
1

Navy, was convicted of assault for engaging in/ a brawl -with two Marine
sentries. Duncan was .tried and convicted.by

a military

tribunal rather than

a civil court. The Supreme Court in a 6 to 2 \decision ruled that civilians
in Hawaii are entitled

t~

their constitutional\ privilege of a fair trial.

When Congress passed the Hawaiian Organic Act in 1900, it never intended to
\

overstep the boundaries of military and civilia.n power. The phrase "martial
law" as employed in that Act, therefore, while intended to authorize the
military to act vigorously for the maintenance of an orderly civil government
and for the defense of the Islands against actual or threateneg,..reoellion or
.--··""

"
invasion, was not intended to authorize
the supplanting of courts by military
l 56Ex pa rte Milligan, 4 Wallace 2 ( 1866).
157Pritchett, p. 353.

- 75 tribunals. The defendant, then was entitled to be tried by a civil
court. 158
Whether the Court's decision in Duncan v. Kahanamoku will set a
precedent in future emergencies, thereby hampering the executive power,
'

..

remains to be seen. A large-scale simulated civil defense test was held in
1955 whereby A-bomb and H.-bomb attacks took a to 11 of some 14 mi 11 ion ci vi 1i an "casualties." Presielent Eisenhower had purposely not been briefed in
advance on actions which might be taken in or'r tb simulate the exercise as
close to reality as possible.

Eisenhower's action was to immediately suspend

the writ of habeas corpus and to declare a nationwide state of martial law,
I
acting on the' premise that "the ordinary proce'sses of democratic and consti tuti ona l government do not suffice to protect the state in time of
emergency and must surrender to a modified authori~arian regime." 159
It could very

~ell

be said, then, that the President as Commander

in Chief will continue to have the

po~er

and authority to suspend the writ

of habeas corpus and to declare martial law· in future crises in that "this
premise is deeply embedded in the teachings of democratic political theory,
which in its traditional and contemporary expression have counselled the·
need to abandon the processes of democratic government as the

fi.J~s-t--essenti a1

'.~,..,---

158ouncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946).
159J. Malcolm Smith and Cornelius P. Cotter, Powers of the President·
During Crises (Washington, O.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1960), p. 4.
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·response to emergency conditions." 160 ..
160tbid •• p. 4.

.//
/

'•

I

I

\.
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CONCLUSION

Having looked at judicial reaction under the broad topics of The
Executive and the Military,•The Executive and the Enemy, and The Executive
and the Domestic Scene, we find that the war powers of 'the President have
been shaped by the Chief Executive through various crises rather than being
defined and checked by the judiciary.

With a few exceptions the Supreme

Court has sustained the President's actions as Commander in Chief either
immediately or well after the fact.

It must be noted, however, that in a

majority of the cases reviewed, the Court declared in its decision that the
subject matter covered was a political question--one to be decided by the
involved organs of power rather than by the Courts.
Given the Court's past action in matters dealing with the President's power and authority under the Commander-in-Chief clause, one might
then ask how strong should the President's power be?

Louis W. Koenig in

the New York Times Magazine wrote that the President should have more power,
not less.
clear.

He said that

11
...

the tas'k of future American leadership is

People must be aroused.

Congress moved, the bureaucracy stilred and
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alliances redirected.

Only the President can do it." 161

President Kennedy said a restricted concept of the Presidency
11

is not enough" The decades of the sixties will demand that the President
11

place himself in the very thick of the fight," and that he be willing to
11

serve them (the people) at the risk of incurring their momentary displeasure. 162
11

'

Robert

Hirschfie~d

in his article, The Power of the Contemporary
11

Presidency, believed that "crisis has become the normal condition of our
11

times,

11

and the power th_at came to an earlier President because of war today
11

has become a permanent part of the executive office.

11

163

Richard Neustadt credits the President's own desire for power as
the strongest deciding factor in determining just how large his powers will
be.

Neus tadt fee 1s "the outcome will often turn on whether he perceived his

risk in power terms and if the President "takes account of what he sees
11

before he makes his choice." 164
Since crisis is a permanent facet of the modern executive office,
161 Louis W. Koenig, "More Power to the President (Not Less), New York
Times Magazine (January 3, 1965).
162 u.s., Congressional Recor~, 86th Cong., 2nd Se~s., A 353-354.
11

163Robert S. Hirschfield, "The Power of the Contemporary Presidency,"
Parliamentary Affairs (Summer, 1961), p. 356.
164Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadershi
(New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1960 , p. 179.
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and since the Supreme Court has followed a consistent pattern of noninterference, the office of the President stands today as the focal point
of American power to be exercised effectively to defend the country and to
repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States.
In conclusion, then, we find that Rossiter was most accurate in
stating that "the contours of the presidential war powers have therefore
been presidentially, not j•dicially shaped; their exercise is for Congress
and the people, not the Court, to oversee." l65 The Presidents of the future
will undoubtedly mold their own powers as Commander in Chief in the light
of their own interpretation of the Constitution, the actions of their predecessors, congressional statutes, and judicial decisions.

Thus equipped

they should prove able in their capacity as Commander in Chief to meet the
ever new and challenging crises which they will inevitably have to face in
domestic emergencies as well as in limited or unlimited wars.
165Rossiter, p. 126.

.
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